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Abstract
There are at least two reasons why sustamability of public debt is an issue of in-
creasing importance. First, public choice considerations show the danger of an
excessive use ofdeficit finance in a democracy. Second, the conditions ofa Europe-
an Monetary Union (EMU) imply further incentives for deficit finance. Various
approaches to assess sustainability ofpublic debt are presented and partially applied
to the Ee countries. According to these results, sustainability is as issue ofempirical
relevance in Europe today and has to be taken seriously on the further way to EMU.
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Sustainability has not been an aspect which has so far played a dominant role in the
economic theory of public debt. Traditionally, the dispute over the burden of debt
has been at the centre of discussion. In this context the focus was on modelling the
effect of deficit versus tax finance on important econ0!llic variables such as interest
rates, consumption and capital formation in order to assess the intertemporal conse-
quences.
Underlying this kind of analysis has been the assumption that government
debt always has to obey an intertemporal budget constraint, i.e. that deficits oftoday
have to be paid back by surpluses of tomorrow.
There are at least two reasons to question this basic assumption and to ask
whether observable debt situations really can be regarded as sustainable and obeying
an intertemporal budget constraint. The one arises from a shifting approach in
explaining economic policy, in particular with regard to public debt. The other
reason concerns the economics of a monetary union, which after the Maastricht
treaty will be 'introduced no later than 1999 in at least some countries of the EC.
Such a step will fundamentally change the restrictions and incentives for debt
finance, making sustainability of public debt an issue of European actuality. These
issues will be discussed in section 2.
After deriving the necessity of evaluating sustainability, the further objective
of this study in section 3 is both methodological and empirical. The methodological
idea is to give an insight into the philosophy and point of view of very different
approaches to sustainability assessment which have so far been developed. Empiri-
cally, these methods are, as far as possible, used to evaluate the European debt
situation. Conclusions for both the economic sense and chances ofrealization ofthe
Maastricht rules concerning public debt are drawn.
2. Sustainabilty - Why It Matters
2.1. The Political Economy of Public Debt
Recently, the focus in public debt theory has moved away from the classical que-
stions ofburden and intertemporal effects towards the determinants ofnational debt
as it is actually observed today. Two -schools deal with this issue from fundamen-tally different approaches, which may be called the "normative" and the "positive"
approach respectively.
The "normative" approach - whose prominent advocate is Robert Barro (t979)
- tries to explain observable public indebtedness as the result .of social welfare
maximizing behaviour. Debt finance is used to minimize,the distortionary.effects·of
high marginal tax rates in times of t~mporarilyfluctuating government expenditure
or revenue. According to this approach, it is optimal to finance a temporary increase
in government expenditure - e.g. in times of war - by debt in order to smooth tax
rates over time. Debt finance would. be used exactly as it should be from the point
of view of a benevolent planner - that is why this approach may be called "norma-
tive".
Proponents ofthe "positive" approach, on the.~ther hand, object to th,e,empiri-
cal relevance ofthe assumption ofsocial welfare maximization (see·von Weizsacker
(1992) for a survey of the positive approach). Instead, it is assumed that.politicians
decide over the finance mix on the grounds of self-interest and the specific .re-
strictions as set by the institutional .environment. In so far as deficit finance is
politically less costly than tax finance or expenditure cuts, this instrument is used
without regard to any social welfare consiclerations.
The political attractiveness of debt finance in a democ~acy origin~tes from
two sources. Debt finance is a far less noticeable means of fmance than taxation.
Voters do not react to deficits in the same way as they do to taxe~. This even ap-
plies to rational voters because of limited lifetime or imperfect capital markets.
Apart from that, debt is a device which serves to tie hands of succeeding govern-
ments. Debt fmance is therefore attractive in countries with unstable governments
and a high degree of political polarization (see Roubini and Sachs (1989).
In their empirical study, Roubini and Sachs (1989) find a more significant
support for the positive explanation ofpublic deficits in industrial countries than for
the normative. It is obvious that a significant empirical support for the positive
approach immediately leads to the issue of sustainability. If debt is politically
attractive, it might develop up to and even above the limits ofwhat might be called
sustainable.
22.2. Public Deficits and EMU
The interest in sustainability ofpublic debt is fuelled not only by the more general
distrust ofpolitical behaviour but also by the special conditions which are to charac-
terize the EMU (see Thygesen (l989)~ Fratianni and von Hagen (1990) for a more
detailed discussion of EMU implications for fiscal policy).
The budget constraints ofnational governments in pre-EMU Europe could be
termed "soft" in comparison to the corresponding constraints for households or
finns. In contrast to these economic agents the state does not depend on market
income; its politicians can claim resources simply by the stroke of a pen signing a
tax law. Furthermore~ the national governments monopolize the issuance of curren-
cies in which most or all of their debt is denominated; they can create the money
which they owe.
The "soft" budget constraint is now hardened both by increasing market
integration and by the impending introduction of a single common currency in the
EC. The increasing market integration makes it less possible to set taxation indepen-
dently - at least where the tax base is mobile. In addition, with a single European
currency controlled by the European Central Bank~ the national governments will
loose control over the money supply and so over an often important source of
revenue. Athough seigniorage will continue to exist in Europe, it will be controlled
and obtained centrally. Neither it will any longer-be possible for national govern-
ments to create surprise inflation with the intention of reducing the real value of
debt.
With constant expenditures and a reduced access to tax revenues and seignio-
rage, debt finance is bound to fill the gap. Especially in countries where the political
strength to cut expenditures is missing~ the debt burden will increase.
The fundamental problem with regard to this inherent inclination to debt
finance in the EMU is that public debt does not only concern the individual country
and its creditors but also the community as a whole. National debt finance has its
impact on macroeconomic variables of the whole community, such as the ECU
exchange rate, the EMU interest rate or the community's balance of payments. In
particular - and that is why the issue of sustainability comes up in this context -
unsustainable debt growth in one country harms the whole community: a debt crisis
of one member country will put pressure on other nations to pay for this debt. This
pressure originates both from political and economic sources. It is difficult to
imagine that with the increasing political integration which is behind the move
3towards EMU a member country would remain in a debt crisis without any direct·or
indirect help by the rest of the Community. Also from an economic point of view
the Community might be forced to "bailout" a heavily indebted member country
because debt repudiation could endanger the stability of the community's fmancial
market and the credibility of an anti-inflationary monetary policy of the European
Central Bank.
The EMU therefore needs binding .rules in order to avoid externalities caused
by excessive national indebtedness. Market discipline is unlikely to work. Because
of bail-out pressures, a country with excessive debt is believed to be backed by the
whole community and therefore does not have to pay a disciplining risk premium on
its debt: Non bail-out clauses in an EMU treaty lack credibility.
3. How to Assess the Sustainability of National Debt
The foregoing considerations show the necessity of specifying the tenn "sustainabili-
ty of public debt". For the smooth working of EMU, it will be necessary to prevent
national policies from running a country into an unsustainable situation. This insight
presumably is behind the Maastricht rules, which restrict gross public debt to 60
percent of GOP and budget deficits to 3 percent of GOP as a precondition to enter
EMU. The question is now whether these limits serve as a suitable indicator of
sustainability or whether better indicators exist.
In subsection 3.1 a fundamental solvency approach is presented which has
economic appeal but lacks empirical applicability. In subsection 3.2 the dynamics of
the debt-income ratio are used to draw conclusions about sustainability but also to
demonstrate the adjustment needs of the EC countries to meet the Maastricht rules.
Finally, in subsection 3.3 time series methods are introduced and applied. to some
EC countries in order to assess sustainability.
3.1. The Balance Sheet Approach
The most straightforward way to assess the sustainability of a public debt situation
is to apply a balance sheet analysis, exactly as it would be done in the case of a
firm (see Buiter (1985) for an exposition of this approach).
4The starting point is the one period government budg<n constraint:
where D denotes net debt, G is government expenditure without interest payments
and R is government revenue. i is the nominal interest rate and the superscript N
denotes nominal values. G-R is the primary deficit.
From equation (l) the following relation is obtained, where all values are now
in real terms and r is the real interest rate:
(2) D'+1 - (l +r) D, = (l+r) (G, - R,)
Discounting and adding the corresponding relations for every future period leads to:
(3) D, =L
j=O
(R,+j - G,+) (1 )' lim Dr
+ +r T ---
(l +rY ~oo (l+rl
[n order to tum this relation into a meaningful restriction the last term has to obey
the following condition:
(4)
The intuition of this condition is easily seen from a finite time perspective. With a
finite time horizon, all debt has to be repaid in the last period; this means that the
present value of the final debt has to be equal zero. Condition (4) is nothing but the
infinite time analogy. Without it, every debt could be "bubble"-financed by simply
rolling it over to the future. This condition does, however, allow for some rolling
over, but it requires that real debt does not grow with a rate higher than the real rate
of interest.
5Splitting the real net debt into real net financial debt Bt and real assets Kt, with Dt








In this fundamental approach, a public debt situation is sustainable if public solven-
cy is given and if there is some positive government net worth.
Obviously, insurmountable problems r.revent this approach from being per-
fectly operational. The p~esent value offuture primary surpluses is based on expec-
tations. Evaluating real assets ofthe public sector might be a manageable jobfor pu-
blic enterprises, land and claims on natural resources. The evaluation ofinfrastructu-
re with public good characteristics, which typically are a main component of public
real assets, is much more difficult. Quantifying public net financial assets does not
seem to be much easier; their value depends for example on the demographic
development in a publicly guaranteed pension system using pay-as-you-go schemes.
Furthermore, politicians try to hide substantial parts ofpublic debt behind off-budget
constructions.
Even if all these difficulties cannot be solved completely, the debt situation
should be assessed within this framework (see Chouraqui et al. (1986) for an ap-
plication of this approach). The Maastricht rule, using gross financial debt in
relation to income, is completely unsatisfactory in the light of this approach. No
private firm's creditworthiness would ever be checked by simply using' a ratio of
gross debt to - say - turnover without regard to its assets and equity.
It would therefore be desirable to develop a uniform and comprehensive
evaluation of government net worth in the EC, which could provide important
information when the decision on who joins the EMU is made.
Since adequate data ofgovernment's net worth do not exist, empirical analysis
of sustainability in this paper is based on gross financial debt. One should keep in
mind that this might give a distorted view of sustainability: behind a rising debt
6burden there might be an increasing stock ofpublicly owned real assets, which leave
the net worth constant.
3.2. Stabilizing the Debt-Income Ratio
The sustainability condition (4) which restricts the growth rate of real debt to be
smallerthan the real interest rate, is still a fairly weak condition. The ratio of debt
to income could grow infinitely without violating this condition ( with the con-
stellation: growth rate of income < growth rate of debt < real interest rate). Alt-
hough such a debt evolution can be shown to be consistent with investors preferen-
ces in a Ricardian model with lump sum taxation (see McCallum (1984», the
outcome is impossible in a more realistic setting. With an ever rising debt-income
ratio, the primary surplus in relation to income has to rise infmitely in order to
restrict the debt's growth rate below the interest rate. Where taxes are distortionary,
however, they cannot exceed income without bounds.
This argument is behind the intuitively appealing sustainability approach,
which focuses on the stabilization of a given debt-income ratio and is applied for
example by the European Commission (1990) and which stands in the tradition of
Domar (1944).
The dynamics ofthe debt-income ratio are derived from the one period budget
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With small letters for ratios to income, 'tt =R/Yt and w the growth rate of real
income, the debt-income ratio evolves according to:
(6) (l+r) d (l+r)
dt+1 - (1 +w) t = (l+w) (gt-'tt)
The solution of this difference equation with s = 'tt - gt' a primary surplus fixed
7relative to income, is:
(7) d
l
= (do - s(1+r) ) (l+r1
1
+ s(l+r) l (r-w) 1+w) (r-w)
This equation detennines the primary surplus which is necessary, given the initial
debt-income ratio do, the real interest and growth rate, t6 stabilize the future debt-
income ratio. Assuming r> w (otherwise every primary deficit is sustainable 'in the





T!Ie gap between s* and the actual primary surplus may be used as a sustainabili.ty_
indicator. This indicator has a straightforward interpretation: it gives the magnitude
by which either revenue has to be increased or expenditure has to be cut relative to
income in order to stop the debt ratio from growing. This indicator, however, does
not differentiate between different levels ofthe debt ratio, as long as they are stabili-
zed.
The concept is helpful to assess the European debt situation but also to show
whether the Maastricht rule of a limiting ratio of 60 percent is attainable for the EC
countries under realistic assumptions.
Results of various calculations are presented here. The quantification of the
real interest and growth rate is of crucial importance for the dynamics of debt.
Averages over a period from 1984 to 1993 are used (including EC projectibns) for
growth rates and over a period from 1984 to 1991 for real interest rates: (data are
from European Commission (1991) and IMF, International Financial Statistics). This
kind ofquantification throws a much more unfavourable light on many EC countries
compared to the above mentioned study ofthe European Commission. In thatstudy
real interest rates are assumed to be equal for all countries at alternatively 4 or 5
percent, growth rates are assumed to be 3.5 percent for countries with a low income
per capita and 3 percent else. With these assumptions the difference betw~en growth
8rate and interest rate (a crucial variable, as can be seen from equation (8» is 2
percent at a maximum. This is too optimistic as an average difference of 3 or 4
percent is nothing historically extraordinary. Taking into account the national history
of real interest and growth rates by using averages as described above seems
therefore to be more appropriate.
The difference between the debt stabilizing primary surplus, calculated
according to equation (8), and those projected by the OECD for 1992 (see OECD
(1991» are in Figure 1. It can be seen that 9 of 12 EC countries are on a course for
further rising debt ratios.
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A simple extension of the dynamics to 1998, the year in which the evaluation of
who will join EMU is most likely to take place, is presented in Figure 2. This
projection is done by caJculating the 1998 debt-income ratios from equation (7),
using the initial debt-income ratios in 1991 and the above described averages for the
real interest and growth rates. It serves to indicate that many of those EC countries
which today still would fulfil the 60 percent debt-income criterion are in danger of
violating this EMU entry condition in 1998. Of course, this simple projection is no
prognosis. It is helpful, however, to demonstrate the arithmetic restrictions and
adjustment needs for future budgetary policy.
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To give an idea ofthe magnitude of necessary adjustment, the following calculation
is useful. Figure 3 shows the "adjustment gap 1998". Given the target of 60 percent
for debt/income in 1998, it is asked which primary surplus would be necessary from
1992 onwards to reach this target. The "adjustment gap 1998" is the difference of
this necessary surplus to the one projected by the OECD for 1992. A gap of one
percent means that the country would have to increase its primary surplus at once
and for the remainig time up to 1998 by one percent of GDP by increasing taxes
and/or cutting expenditure. According to this interpretation, the adjustment gap for
six countries seems to be beyond reach: three of the southern countries (Portugal,
Greece and Italy), but also Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands face an adjustment
which hardly seems politically feasible. The low or even negative adjustment'gaps
for Germany, France, Spain and Great Britain should not be misinterpreted as an
indication of very sound debt dynamics; these gaps are simply due to the fact that
present debt ratios in these countries are still significantly below the 60 percent
mark so that they can still afford a rising debt ratio.
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3.3. Time-Series Methods to Assess Sustainability of Debt
The balance-sheet approach has made it clear that sustainability is essentially an
intertemporal concept, since much depends on an'unobservable item on the balance
sheet, which is the present value of future surpluses. Every temporary deficit is
sustainable as long as it is matched by adequate future surpluses. For this reason the
long run behaviour of debt and deficits is crucial for the issue of sustainability.
This insight is behind tests on sustainability of public debt which apply time
series methods and ask whether the observable characteristics of debt related varia-
bles obey those restrictions which can be obtained from'the solvency condition (4).
These methods were first developed by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) to analyse the
US· debt situation in the 1980s and can be fruitfully applied for European analysis.
The starting point of Hamilton and Flavin is that creditors form expectations
on relation (3):
(3)' D, = £, L (R'+j - G,+) + (l+rY £ lim ~
j=l (1 +rY I T~oo (l+r)T
As a test for sustainability, Hamilton and Flavin propose testing:
111
0 D
A := E 1m __ T_ 0
I T~oo (1 +rl
A given debt situation is only sustainable if it is expected to be matched by the
present value offuture surpluses and ifthe "bubble-term" A in (3)' is equal to zero.
Hamilton and Flavin test Ho indirectly (in their paper they also estimate (3)' directly
by assuming a certain pattern of expectation formulation and then test for the
significance of the A estimate). First they apply unit root tests to find out, whether
the real primary surplus (Rt-Gt) is a stationary time-series ("stationarity of the
undiscounted surplus being. sufficient for stationarity of the sum of expected dis-
counted surpluses, assuming a positive real interest rate", see Wilcox (1989), p.297).
Non-stationary behaviour of the real debt Dr can then only originate from a non
valid Ho• Therefore in a second step they test real debt for stationarity. If the
stationarity of D1 is rejected and the primary surplus is accepted as stationary, the
Hamilton-Flavin test indicates unsustainability.
Here this test has been applied to six EC countries with annual data from the
IMP's International Financial Statistics (IFS) for a period from the 19508 (the
starting year differs among countries) up to the present. The exact time period and
so the number of observations are presented in the table. Augmented-Dickey-Fuller
tests are used to test for a unit root first in the real primary surplusI and second in
the real debt (see Table 1).
Only in the case of Germany and France :can a unit root be rejected for
surpluses, which means that the Hamilton-Flavin test is applicable only to these
countries. Since the non-stationary null-hypothesis cannot be rejected for Germany
and France with respect to Dt at the conventional 5 percent significance level, the
Hamilton-Flavin approach indicates an unsustainable debt growth for both countries.
1Since IFS contains only surpluses including interest payments the primary surplus had
to be approximated by adding estimated interest payments calculated as-debt times a moving
average of past interest rates on government bondso
12Table 1: Unit-Root Tests for real primary surplus and debt
1 country IB
1
0 IF II IIRL INL I
real primary surplus
period 60-87 54-88 54-88 54-89 52-89 54-88
AOF(l)l -1,06 -3,19·· -3,36··· -1,05 -0,53 -2,50





period 55-88 54-90 53-89 53-90 52-89 54-89
AOF(l)J 0,12 2,40 1,81 2,86 0,25 0,47
AOF(l) -1,23 -0,91 0,41 0,91 -1,77 -0;47
with trend
2
1: t-value of OLS estImate of a in: ~Yl=c+aYl_l+~~Yl_J+Ut
2: t-value of OLS estimate of a in: ~Yt=c+Bt+aYt_l+~~Yl_l+~
*/**/*** significance level of 10%/5%/2,5% according to Fuller(l976)
The Hamilton-Flavin procedure can be criticized on the grounds that in a growing
economy it does not make sense to assume a stationary primary surplus or to
demand a stationary real debt series. Trehan and Walsh (1988) suggest a more
general approach. They assume the following stochastic behaviour of government
expenditure and revenue (actually, they analyse a trivariate process including
seigniorage):
(9) [~~ =6~:J =p + C(L) £,
where Jl is a 2xl vector and C(L) a 2x2 matrix of polynomials in the lag operator
L. Applying the solvency restriction (4) they show that as a consequence expenditu-
re (inclusive of interest payments) and revenues have to be cointegrated with
13
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A_c Inc:tita It~ fiil" Wol~\AJ; r+r,..h~llcointegrating vector (1 I), which is equivalent to stationarity of the secondary (i.e.
including interest payments) surplus. In contrast to the Hamilton-Flavin model in
this setting the primary surplus can be a non-stationary time-series. It has only to be
cointegrated with debt with cointegrating vector (1 r): This linear combination is
nothing but the secondary surplus, which has to be stationary.
The test procedure is now the following. First, one tests whether observable
revenue and expenditure series obey the restrictions of the stochastic structure (9)~
whether they have a unit root. Then either the stationarity of the real secondary
surplus or the cointegration of revenue and expenditure are tested. Before doing so,
sU,9Jlus and expenditure series have to be adjusted for the effect of inflation on the
real vahie ofdebt by adding 1tDt_ l/Pt to real surpluses and expenditures respectively.
This is necessary in order to keep the change in real debt related to the real surplus.
Otherwhise, it would for example be possible to hav~ a real deficit and at the same
time a decline of the real debt.
Table 2: Unit root tests for real government revenue and expenditure
1 country IB 1 0 IF II IIRL INL I
real government revenue
period 56-86 54-88 52-88 53-89 52-89 54-88
AOF(l)1 0,18 -0,09 0,93 3,27 0,84 0,14




period 60-87 55-89 54-88 54-89 53-89 55-88
ADF(I)1 -0,09 -0,11 0,76 1,71 -0,64 0,15
ADF(I) with -1,88 -1,86 -1,99 -1,00 -1,99 -1,89
trend
2
1,2: see table I
*/**/*** significance level of 10%/5%/2,5% according to Fuller(l976)
14Table,2 c()ntains ADF statistics for revenue and expenditure, indicating that the Ho
of a unit,root can not be rejected and that therefore (9) seems to be an ,appropriate
stochastic specification. Table 3 shows the results of ADF tests on the stationarity
of the ,real secondary surplus. Of the·six countries, Germany and Ireland show
statistics, which are for time trend ex- and including ADF tests in the 10% region
for rejecting the non-stationary Ho and therefore are compatible with the sustainabili-
ty res~riction. ~taly's statistics are equivocal with contradicting ADF tests, while for
Belgium" France and the Netherlands both tests indicate unsustainability.
Table 3: Unit root tests for real secondary surplus
country B 0 F I IRL NL
period 60-87 55-88 54-88 54-89 53-89 55-88
ADF(l)1 -0,50 -2,65· -2,01 -1,25 -2,77· -1,38
ADF(I) with -0,93 -3,16 -2,19 -3,33· -2,90 -2,01
trend
2
1,2: see table I
"'/"''''/**''' significance level of 10%/5%/2,5% according to Fuller(1976)
Table 4 shows the results of the Engle-Granger testing procedure for cointegration
between revenue and expenditure. The estimates of a in the cointegration equation
R1=aGI+ul give a first hint on sustainability. For a sustainable relation, a should be
equal to one. The stationarity tests for the residuals of the estimated cointegration
equations reject cointegration clearly in the case of Belgium and Netherlands,
implying a sustainability problem for their long ron debt behaviour.
Table 4: Engle-Granger test on cointegration of government revenue and expenditure
country B 0 F I IRL NL
period 58-86 53-88 52-88 52-89 51-89 53-88
alpha
l 0,91 0,97 0,97 . 0,88 0,91 0,96
ADF(I)2 -1,57 -3,19 -2,73 -3,31 -3,38 -1,24
residuals·
I: OLS estimate of a in: ~=a G, + ~
2: the critical value for a sample size of 100 is -3,17 (-2,91)
at a significance level of 5% (10%), see RUdel(1989)
15The results for Italy seem to be puzzling. Although the a estimate of the cointegra-
tj.on relation is clearly below one, indicating a permanent and substantial shortfall of
revenue in relation to expenditure, the statistical criteria, however, hint on sustaina-
bility. A clue to this contradiction might be the' importance of seigniorage as a
means of financing the Italian budget in the past. This seigniorage might not be
included comprehensively in the revenue series ofthe IPS. Official payments ofthe
central bank to the government are only a part of seigniorage. Other parts can' hide
for example behind cheap central, bank credit to the government. If this is -the
explanation for the Italian results there will be a more acute sustainability problem
at the latest in the EMU future without further free control of seigniorage.
4.Conclusion
Both public choice considerations and the specific setting of a European Monetary
Union explain the increasing importance of sustainability considerations of public
debt.
Sustainability can be analyzed with very different tools. The fundamental
balance-sheet approach is theoretically satisfying. However, its deficiency lies in the
unsufficient applicability due to serious problems of quantification. Additional
information can be obtained from looking into the dynamics of debt evolution. This
is helpful because it explicates the importance of economic variables such as the
real growth and interest rate. Furthermore it serves to clarify the dynamic restric-
tions within that any debt adjustment has to take place. Looking into the long-run
behaviour of debt using time-series methods seems to be particularly appropriate
because it corresponds to the intertemporal character of the sustainability concept
which allows temporarily substantial deficits an4 imposes ,only a long-term re-
striction. A drawback of this approach is, however, its backward looking character
which makes it difficult to take account of a structural break at the present edge of
data.
Behind this methodological background it iS'difficult to see a relation between
the Maastricht criteria for limiting public debt and the concept of sustainability.
However, these criteria have the property to be unequivocal which might be a
crucial political advantage.
Table 5 shows a synopsis of sustainability indicators (+(-) indicating (un)su-
stainability). The first two rows relate to the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria in
161991. The third row reports whether as a result ofthe projection according to Figure
2 the countries can be expected to fulfil the debt-income ratio criterion in 1998, the
year, in which most likely the decisive assessment for EMU participation is done.
The last three rows collect the results ofthe time-series analysis ofsection 3.3. Two
results have to be emphasized. First, sustainability of public debt is an issue which
is of high empirical relevance in the EC today. This fact underlines the need to
discuss further ~ consequences ofexcessive national debt for a satisfying working
of EMU. Second, most EC countries are in danger to miss the target of a maximum
60 percent debt-income ratio in 1998 unless there will be further improvement in the
national budgets. The possibility ofa majority ofEC countries violating the criterion
casts doubt on the credibility ofa serious application of these criterion as a precon-
dition for EMU entry.
Table 5: Synopsis of Sustainability Indicators
8 D DK F OR IR I L NL P SP UK
Maastricht - - + + - - - + - - - +
deficit<=3%
Maastricht - + +/- + - - - + - - + +
debt <= 60%





TrehanlWalsh - + - + +i~ -
(Table 3)
Trehan/Walsh - + - + +/- -
(Table 4)
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